Private equity owned companies'  performance in Sweden after the financial crises in 2007-2008 by Andersson, Joakim & Daun, Fredrik
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Private	  equity	  owned	  companies’	  performance	  in	  
Sweden	  after	  the	  financial	  crisis	  in	  2007-­‐2008	  
	  
	  
Project	  Paper	  with	  Discussant	  –	  Finance	  Autumn	  2014	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
Authors:	  Joakim	  Andersson	  	  920305-­‐1231	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  Fredrik	  Daun	  930713-­‐4396	  	  
	  
Adviser:	  	  Jianhua	  Zhang	  	  	  
	   	  
	  
Abstract	  	  	  
The private equity industry has grown tremendously in the past 20-30 years, and several 
studies have been made to examine the potential superior returns by private equity owned 
companies. However, there has been limited research on the performance of private equity 
owned companies during extraordinary conditions, such as financial crises. The aim of this 
paper is to compare the performance of publicly traded companies to the performance of 
private equity owned companies during a four year period after the financial crisis, and 
examine what factors had impacted the companies’ profitability the most. It was hypothesized 
that increased growth, a higher debt level and decreased working capital would have had a 
positive impact on profitability. The results show that increased growth and higher debt levels 
had a positive significant impact on profitability for private equity owned companies, while 
having had a negative impact on profitability for publicly traded companies. Reduced 
working capital did not have a statistically significant impact on profitability. The 
interpretation of these results is that private equity owned companies were better at 
optimizing their capital structure, even under extraordinary conditions. Furthermore, the 
interpretation of the negative effect of increased growth on profitability for publicly traded 
companies is that they did not perform as well after the financial crisis as the private equity 
owned companies. The conclusion from this study is therefore that private equity owned 
companies did recover better than publicly traded companies, and that growth and debt level 
affected the companies’ profitability the most.   
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1.	  Introduction	  	  
1.1 Background	  	  
The private equity industry and the number of LBO’s have increased tremendously in the 
western part of the world in the last 20-30 years. In 2011, the private equity industry 
accounted for 8.8 % of GDP and 4.3 % of the total employment in Sweden. Furthermore, €28 
billion were invested in European companies by private equity firms in 2012. Such an 
increase raises the question of why the private equity industry has increased so fast and how 
they succeed (Brizell, 2014). 
 
Lots of studies have already been made in this area, mainly focusing on the potential superior 
growth and profitability of private equity owned companies, but also on how the management 
changes during the holding period. Several studies have also been made on the impacts of 
different exit strategies. Recently, Sweden and the rest of the western world went through one 
of the biggest financial crises in modern time. Few studies have been made to examine 
whether or not the management and capital structure of private equity owned companies are 
superior in times of a financial crisis, and how the private equity owned companies recovered 
after the crisis compared to publicly traded companies. 
1.2	  Objective	  	  
The aim of this paper is to compare the performance of private equity owned companies to the 
performance of publicly traded companies and conclude which group recovered best from the 
financial crisis, and to examine how companies’ profitability in the two groups has been 
affected by the choice of capital structure, the asset growth and the management in working 
capital. This paper will solely focus on the Swedish market during a four-year period after the 
financial crisis.  
1.3	  Layout	  of	  the	  thesis	  
In section one a background to the issue and the aim of the thesis is presented. Section two 
starts with a short introduction of the private equity industry, followed by a study of relevant 
theory. The introduction to private equity consists of information about how the private equity 
industry works and how their holding companies differ from publicly traded companies. 
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Furthermore, the capital structure’s impact on profitability is presented in the theory section. 
Section three consists of a literature review of corporate governance, working capital and how 
operational improvements affect a firm’s value and profitability. Together section two and 
section three forms the basis for the hypotheses of the thesis. In section four, the hypotheses 
of the thesis are presented, as well as how they are related to the theory. Section five describes 
of the methodology used in the study. The methodology is presented in a chronological order; 
starting with how the data was collected, how comparable companies were selected, a 
presentation of the econometric model used in the analysis, descriptive statistics, 
heteroskedasticity problems, performance measures and differences with the methodology 
used in our source of inspiration. In section six the results of the study are presented and 
analyzed. In section seven the conclusions of the study’s findings are presented, as well as an 
evaluation of the thesis. Section eight consists of recommendations for further research.  
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2.	  Theory	  
2.1	  Private	  Equity	  	  
The difference between private equity and non-private equity is that private equity refers to an 
investment in a company that is not publicly traded (Sampson, 2007). This does not tell how 
to define a private investment in a public company, which is commonly made by private 
equity firms, but due to the basic nature of this paper this will also be considered to be a 
private equity investment. 
 
A private equity transaction, also referred to as a leveraged buyout (LBO), occurs when a 
private equity (PE) firm acquires a private or public company with borrowed capital. In a 
leveraged buyout transaction, the private equity firm typically gains majority share of the 
acquired, existing or mature company. This is not to be confused with a venture capital (VC) 
transaction, which usually invests in young or emerging companies and typically does not 
gain majority share. While VC firms typically does not gain majority share in the companies 
they invest, private equity firms typically focuses on majority ownership due to its desire to 
strongly influence and develop the acquired company’s operations. After the acquisition, the 
private equity firm typically applies performance-based managerial objectives, highly 
leveraged capital structures and active governance to the acquired company (Strömberg & 
Kaplan, 2008).  
2.2	  Capital	  structure	  	  
A company’s liabilities consist of equity and debt, the proportion of which forms the 
company’s capital structure (Berk, 2011). The capital structure impacts the cost of capital but 
also the profitability.  
 
According to the Modigliani-Miller proposition, the capital structure does not affect the value 
of a firm if the capital market is assumed to be perfect (Berk, 2011). The firm value is defined 
as the price of buying the entire company, thus debt plus the market value of equity. Since the 
value of the firm is independent of the capital structure when the market is assumed to be 
perfect, the change in capital structure only affect the allocation of the cash flow between 
equity holders and creditors. Furthermore, equity and debt have the same cost; the allocation 
does not affect the value if there are no taxes or transaction costs. More specific, a perfect 
capital market is defined as a market where: 
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1. Investors and firms can trade the same set of securities at competitive market prices 
equal to the present value of their future cash flow. 
 
2. There are no taxes, transaction costs, or issuance costs associated with security trading. 
 
3. A firm’s financing decisions do not change the cash flows generated by its investments, 
nor do they reveal information about them (Berk, 2011). 
 
 
In reality though, there are no perfect markets due to different factors such as different price 
of different securities, risks, tax shields and costs of financial distress. Taking these factors in 
consideration, the capital structure does affect the value of a company. In general the creditors 
demand a lower return than the equity holders, but this cost cannot be considered as the cost 
of debt solely since higher debt increases the risk for equity. Even if there is no risk for the 
company to default, the risk of equity increases and thereby the price of equity, which may 
result in that the total cost of capital is unchanged (Berk, 2011). Since there are no perfect 
markets, the capital structure does affect the value of the firm. The leverage of the firms will 
not only affect the value of the firm, but also the profitability. The capital structure is 
therefore an important factor to consider and will be further studied in this paper.  
  
As previously mentioned, the tax shield gained when using debt typically results in a higher 
income available for all investors. This is because all interest expenses are tax deductible, 
which makes higher leverage preferable. However if a company fails to pay interest to their 
creditors they default on the loan and might even go into bankruptcy in a worst-case scenario. 
In those cases, the creditors have a legal right to the company’s assets, while equity holders 
have not. Since the company can lose vital assets for the core business by having too much 
debt, high leverage can in some cases be very harmful for a company. In addition to this, 
other expenses arise when a company is in financial distress, e.g. fees to lawyers. Since the 
creditors are keen of receiving their interest payments, cost of financial distress might arise 
before a company defaults if the company seems to be in the risk zone of defaulting. The 
capital structure, or the choice of leverage, therefore becomes a strategic question for each 
company.  
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2.3	  Corporate	  governance	  	  
One of the most common explanations for the potentially superior returns of private equity 
owned companies is the agency theory. The agency theory states that a possible explanation 
for the superior returns of private equity owned companies is that they do not suffer from 
principal-agent problems to the extent that publicly traded companies might do. Principal-
agent problems are problems that arise when the principal (i.e. owner, board) and the agent 
(i.e. CEO, management) have different objectives and act in their own best interests. The 
agency theory states that these kinds of problems can be eliminated by aligning the interests 
of principals and agents and thus reducing its impact on the agency costs. 
 
Bebchuk et.al. (2004) states that agency costs mainly arise from two human factors; moral 
hazards and conflict of interests. Moral hazard refers to the situation of handling risk without 
considering the possible negative consequences. A common example of this is the banking 
industry. During the past few years several banking crises have occurred, many of which 
resulted in governments using taxpayer money to bail out the banks. This strongly implies 
that banks have not suffered the full negative consequences of their risk-taking (Boyd, 2000). 
 
Conflict of interests may arise when a CEO’s bonus and/or salary is based on the performance 
of the company’s stock, which might incentivize CEO to short-term boost the stock price of 
the company while the board and owners most likely has a more long-term objective. This is a 
common example of the principal-agent problem described above. Jensen (1989) states that 
principal-agent problems may be reduced or even eliminated when a private equity firm 
aligns the interests of the principals and the agents. The way to commonly give the agents the 
same interest as the principals is to reward the agents with illiquid assets such as stocks or 
options, which recently has become more common now than back in the 80s in the early years 
of the private equity-industry (Jensen & Murphy, 1990). Rewarding top management with 
these types of illiquid assets is supposed to incentivize them by a large upside when the 
company is running well, but also giving them a huge risk to lose a lot of money if the 
company does not perform well.    
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3.	  Literature	  review	  	  
3.1	  Operational	  improvements	  	  
Operational improvements have lately become the most eminent way to increase an acquired 
company’s value, and according to Vester (2011) operational adjustment corresponds to two 
thirds of the increased value of an acquired firm on average. The performance of operational 
improvements can be measured in a variety of ways, e.g. by using multiples such as 
sales/employee, EBITDA/sales, growth etc. How the management chooses to improve these 
measures varies but common practices include market expansion, cost cutting and mergers. 
The importance of operational improvements can be somewhat confirmed by the fact that 
private equity firms usually hire former executives to manage the acquired company 
(Strömberg and Kaplan, 2008). Additionally, many private equity firms also choose to hire 
consultants to help boost the growth and performance of the acquired company. 
3.2	  Working	  capital	  	  
An additional way to increase the value of a firm is to improve its management of the 
working capital (Lichtenberg and Siegal, 1990). When the working capital, e.g. accounts 
receivable, accounts payable and inventory, is managed more efficiently it is quite possible 
that the value of the firm increases as well. Furthermore, a decrease in working capital will 
also free cash that can be used to either distribute dividend to the private equity firm or to pay 
off debt. Holthausen (1996) states that companies owned by private equity firms appear have 
a lower working capital than their peers on average.  
3.3	  Profitability	  	  
All private equity firms aim for higher profitability through optimal capital structure, more 
efficient operations and the reduction of principal-agent problems. There are several ways to 
measure profitability. In this paper return of equity (RoE) and return on assets (RoA) will be 
used.  
 
RoE is interesting to private equity firms since it is the return for the equity holders. A 
company with a higher debt ratio, defined as debt over total assets, will have higher RoE 
compared to its peer when they both have the same RoA. Return on assets on the other hand, 
is a measurement of the profitability relative to the company’s total assets, which is 
independent of the capital structure. 
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4.	  Hypotheses	  	  
The hypotheses are based on the previous discussion in the theory and literature review 
sections, and will be tested with econometric models using data collected primarily from 
Bloomberg. The main factors identified that affect companies’ profitability are operational 
improvements, agency governance, choice of capital structure and reduced working capital. 
When outlining what performance measures to use in the study, we gathered information 
about performance measures used in previous studies within this subject and selected the most 
appropriate for our analysis. Performance measures that are not vital for our study have been 
filtered.   
As stated in section three, operational improvements have lately been the most eminent way 
to increase the value of a company. A common measure of operational improvements is 
growth. Thus it is expected that growth will have a positive impact on profitability, forming 
the basis for the hypothesis 1. 
Hypothesis 1: Increased growth has had a positive impact on profitability.  
It is expected that private equity firms more often choose optimal capital structure in their 
holdings than publicly traded companies. As presented in the theory section, increased 
leverage results in higher tax shields that increases both the profit and also the risk of 
financial distress. This trade-off, often referred to as the trade-off theory, is one factor, which 
lays the basis for companies' choice of leverage. However, as long as there is no financial 
distress, it is expected that higher leverage will have a positive impact on profitability. It is 
expected that private equity firms are willing to have higher leverage due to better 
management and risk diversification in their portfolio. Furthermore, higher leverage might 
also incentivize top management to work harder and make good decisions since their bonuses 
often are illiquid assets based on the company's long-term performance. Thus, it is expected 
that increased leverage will have a positive impact on profitability, and that this effect will be 
greater for private equity owned companies, which lays the basis for hypothesis 2. 
Hypothesis 2: Increased leverage will have had a positive impact on profitability. The effect 
for private equity owned companies is expected to be greater than the effect for publicly 
traded companies.  
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With a similar discussion, it is also expected that the private equity firm's capital structure 
will have a positive impact on the profitability of its holdings, which forms hypothesis 3. 
Hypothesis 3: Increased leverage within a private equity firm will have had a positive 
impact on probability for its holdings.  
As stated in the literature review a company's working capital is generally reduced when 
owned by a private equity firm. When the working capital is more efficiently managed it is 
expected that the value of the firm increase as well. Furthermore, a decrease in working 
capital will also free cash, which can be used to pay off debt or to give dividend to the equity 
holders. Thus, it is expected that increased working capital will have a negative effect on 
profitability for both private equity owned and publicly traded companies, which leads to 
hypothesis 4. 
Hypothesis 4: Increased working capital will have had a negative impact on profitability. 
It is also expected that other factors related to private equity ownership, such as managerial 
improvements made by the private equity firm, will have had a positive impact on 
profitability, resulting in a fifth hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 5: Private equity ownership has had a positive impact on the private equity 
owned company's profitability.  
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5.	  Methodology	  
5.1	  Data	  	  
The first step of collecting the data was to decide which database to use. As previously stated, 
the required data is somewhat hard to access due to the secretive nature of private equity firms. 
Furthermore, a private equity firm should not have previously owned the publicly traded 
companies. The publicly traded companies also needed to fulfil certain criteria, which are 
presented in section 5.2. These companies who served as peers, are mainly traded on the 
Nasdaq OMX Stockholm Small Cap list. The distribution of publicly traded and private 
equity owned companies is presented in table 1. A complete list of private equity owned 
companies used in the study can be found in appendix.  
 
Table 1 
N.o	  companies	   N.o	  Publicly	  traded	  companies	   N.o	  Private	  Equity	  owned	  companies	  
136	   96	   40	  
Sample size and size of the subgroups  
 
Since the report focuses on the Swedish market, the objective was to find private equity firms 
active in Sweden. In the search for data, several databases were examined, such as Capital IQ, 
Bloomberg and Data Stream. Bloomberg turned out to provide the best information about 
private equity holdings in Sweden, which is why it was chosen to be the main source of data 
for this study. Furthermore, Bloomberg also provided information about ownership history, 
which was useful when examining whether the peers had previously been owned by a private 
equity firm or not. Since the aim of this study is to examine and compare private equity 
owned companies’ and publicly traded companies’ performance after the financial crisis, 
companies which had been acquired by a private equity firm later than 2008 have been 
filtered. Information about the private equity firm’s debt level was not easily accessed via 
Bloomberg, which is why another source, Orbit, was used to find this information.  
5.2	  Comparable	  companies	  	  
It is imperative to study companies within the same industry since e.g. high growth rate in one 
industry might be considered low in another. However, enough data to make such a study 
significant was not possible to obtain within the time scope of this study, which is why this 
study is limited to comparing private equity owned companies and publicly traded companies 
in general and not industry specific. The companies still had to be of comparable size in order 
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for them not to benefit from economies of scale, and data needed to be accessible for all the 
four years after the financial crisis. Another criterion to be fulfilled for the peers is that a 
private equity firm may not have previously owned them, since that would most likely make 
the results biased. To make sure all of these criteria were fulfilled, Bloomberg was used to 
examine the size, data availability and ownership history.  
5.3	  Performance	  Measures	  	  
In order to test the hypotheses discussed in the previous section, some performance measures 
have been defined and each performance measure’s effect on profitability will be studied.  
The performance measures are the following: 
 
1. Asset Growth 
 
2. Debt level  
 
3.  Working Capital 
 
The first performance measure is asset growth, defined as the most recent years’ assets over 
the previous years’ assets. As stated in the literature review, operational improvements are 
one of the most eminent ways to increase a company’s value, and that growth is a 
measurement of operational improvements. Thus, it is expected that growth is important for a 
company’s profitability. The second performance measure is the debt level, defined as: 
 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡  𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 =    𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 + 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 
 
As discussed in the theory section the capital structure is directly related to the company’s 
profitability, and thus it is an important factor to consider. The third profitability measure is 
working capital, which is also discussed in the literature review. When a company’s working 
capital is managed more efficiently, cash will be freed which can be used to either pay down 
debt or to give dividend to the equity holders. Thus, the working capital is also an important 
factor to consider in this study. As previously stated, private equity ownership may have other 
effects on profitability that cannot be measured by the measurements described above. In 
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order to capture and measure these effects, a private equity dummy is added to examine if 
private equity ownership affects profitability in other ways. 
5.4	  Econometric	  models	  	  
In the process of testing the hypotheses, several econometric models were set up, of which 
two were selected. Model one has return on assets as the dependent variable and model two 
has return on equity as the dependent variable. The independent variables in the econometric 
models are debt level, working capital and asset growth. Our model also consists of a private 
equity dummy variable in order for it to capture other factors, such as managerial 
improvements and better incitement for top management. Furthermore, the model also 
consists of a variable representing the private equity firms’ debt level in order to examine 
whether the private equity firm’s debt level had a significant impact on profitability or not.  
 
Model 1 
RoA = α0 + β0(Debt-level) + β1(Growth) + β2(Working Capital) + β3(Debt-level PE-firm) + β4(PE-Dummy) 
 
Model 2 
RoE = α0 + β0(Debt-level) + β1(Growth) + β2(Working Capital) + β3(Debt-level PE-firm) + β4(PE-Dummy) 
5.5	  Descriptive	  statistics	  	  
In table 2 – 4, the mean and standard deviation for the data sample are presented. As 
presented in table 2, the mean of RoA of the whole data sample was negative while the mean 
of RoE was positive. As seen in table 3, the mean of both RoA and RoE for private equity 
owned companies were positive while being negative for publicly traded companies, as seen 
in table 4.  
 
Furthermore, it is shown in tables 3 and 4 that the debt level and asset growth were higher on 
average for private equity companies. However, the average working capital is lower for 
publicly traded companies than for private equity owned companies.  
 
As seen in table 3 the standard deviation for RoE is 18 times higher for private equity owned 
companies than for publicly traded companies. This is because of one company had 
extraordinarily high leverage during 2009 and had a positive return on assets, which made its 
return on equity very high. The standard deviations for the independent variables are similar, 
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except the standard deviation for working capital that was almost twice as high for private 
equity owned companies.  
 
Table 2 
Whole	  data	  sample	  2009-­‐2012	   Mean	   Standard	  Deviation	  
RoA(%)	   -­‐0,83	   21,14	  
RoE	  (%)	   17,12	   340,00	  
Debt	  Level	  (%)	   49,22	   23,63	  
Asset	  Growth	  (%)	   9,60	   50,78	  
Working	  Capital	   93,29	   287,23	  
Mean and standard deviation of the whole data sample 
 
Table 3 
PE-­‐owned	  companies	  2009-­‐2012	   Mean	   Standard	  Deviation	  
RoA(%)	   2,66	   20,90	  
RoE	  (%)	   66,43	   621,56	  
Debt	  Level	  (%)	   61,87	   23,10	  
Asset	  Growth	  (%)	   16,38	   54,40	  
Working	  Capital	   116,80	   398,70	  
Mean and standard deviation of the private equity owned companies 
 
Table 4 
Publicly	  traded	  companies	  2009-­‐2012	   Mean	   Standard	  Deviation	  
RoA(%)	   -­‐2,28	   21,07	  
RoE	  (%)	   -­‐3,43	   36,88	  
Debt	  Level	  (%)	   43,95	   21,77	  
Asset	  Growth	  (%)	   6,77	   48,92	  
Working	  Capital	   83,50	   224,31	  
Mean and standard deviation of the publicly traded companies 
 
The correlation matrices for model 1 and 2 are presented in tables 5 and 6. As seen in the 
tables, the correlation between debt level and profitability was 0,13 on average. The 
correlation between RoA and growth was also stronger than the correlation between growth 
and RoE. Working capital had a weak correlation with both RoA and RoE. RoAs correlation 
with the private equity firm’s debt level was also stronger than the correlation between return 
on equity and the private equity firm’s debt level. Note that the correlation between the 
private equity firm’s debt levels is strongly correlated with the debt level of the private equity 
owned company.  
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Table 5 
Correlation	  Matrix	  Model	  1	  
Variables	   1.	   2.	   3.	   4.	   5.	  
1.	  RoA	   1,00	   	   	   	   	  
2.	  Debt	  Level	   0,14	   1,00	   	   	   	  
3.	  Growth	   0,19	   0,11	   1,00	   	   	  
4.	  Working	  Capital	   0,08	   -­‐0,16	   -­‐0,02	   1,00	   	  
5.	  PE-­‐Debt	  Level	   0,14	   0,24	   0,08	   0,04	   1,00	  
Correlation matrix of Model 1 
 
Table 6 
Correlation	  Matrix	  Model	  2	  
Variables	   1.	   2.	   3.	   4.	   5.	  
1.	  RoE	   1,00	   	   	   	   	  	  
2.	  Debt	  Level	   0,12	   1,00	   	   	   	  	  
3.	  Growth	   0,02	   0,11	   1,00	   	   	  	  
4.	  Working	  Capital	   0,00	   -­‐0,16	   -­‐0,02	   1,00	   	  	  
5.	  PE-­‐Debt	  Level	   0,01	   0,24	   0,08	   0,04	   1,00	  
Correlation matrix of Model 2 
5.6	  Heteroskedasticity	  and	  omitted	  variables	  	  
In the initial regressions, the Breusch-Pagan test showed evidence of heteroskedasticity. After 
trying several methods to solve this problem. It was concluded that weighted least squares 
was the best method to solve the problem which is why it was used. Using weighted least 
squares also strengthened the R-squared in the regression. However, since the weighted least 
squares method was used the growth variable in the regression, denoted growth star, is 
defined as one over the company’s asset growth as presented in the formula below: 
 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ  𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟 =    1𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 
 
5.7	  Methodology	  used	  compared	  with	  source	  of	  inspiration	  	  
In the early process of writing this paper, it was obvious that several papers had already been 
written about private equity. In order to understand private equity and to find a unique niche 
for this paper, several of these papers were studied. The main source of inspiration for this 
paper is “Private Equity Performance: What do we know?” written by Robert Harris and 
published in the Journal of Finance in October 2014.  In order to examine a new area within 
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this subject, some changes in methodology were made to customize this paper to the Swedish 
market.  
 
Fewer companies are studied in this study, mainly because information about private equity 
holdings is scarce and hard to obtain and since the Swedish market is smaller than the 
American market. Another difference is that this study solely focuses on companies in 
Sweden, however the private equity firms may be of foreign origin. Like the source of 
inspiration, this study also makes a clear distinction between private equity and venture 
capital ownership. Harris studied both categories, but only private equity ownership is 
considered in this paper. Furthermore, the performance measures used in this study are also 
different from those used in the source of inspiration. In “Private Equity Performance: What 
do we know?” something called “Public Market Equivalent” is used, which is a number of 
analyses used to benchmark private equity firms with a publicly traded index, internal rate of 
return and investment multiples. In this paper asset growth, debt level and working capital are 
used as performance measures. Public Market Equivalent is not used in this study, since the 
aim is to find the factors that affect the profitability the most. Furthermore, Harris uses capital 
flows into private equity firms as the dependent variable, but this study uses return on assets 
and return on equity as the dependent variables in the two models.  
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6.	  Results	  and	  analysis	  	  
In this section, the findings of the study is presented and analysed. First, the regressions are 
presented, and then an analysis of each variable follows.   
6.1	  Regressions	  	  
Below in the table 7 the results of both regressions are presented.  
Table 7 
Independent	  variable	   Model	  1:	  RoA	  	   Model	  2:	  RoE	  	  
Debt-­‐level	  (PE-­‐owned)	   0.65**	  (7.73)	  
1.06**	  
(2.71)	  
Debt-­‐level	  (Public)	   -­‐0.34**	  (-­‐20.02)	  
-­‐0.72**	  
(-­‐9.11)	  
Growth	  Star(PE-­‐owned)	   -­‐8.78**	  (-­‐5.50)	  
-­‐15.73*	  
(-­‐2.12)	  
Growth	  Star	  (Public)	   7.07**	  (12.51)	  
14.74**	  
(5.62)	  
Working	  Capital	  (PE-­‐owned)	   -­‐0.005	  (-­‐1.18)	  
-­‐0.023	  
(-­‐1.19)	  
Working	  Capital	  (Public)	   -­‐0.00	  	  (-­‐1.54)	  
-­‐0.007	  
(-­‐0.81)	  
Debt-­‐level	  (PE-­‐Firm)	   0.07*	  (2.27)	  
0.17	  
(1.29)	  
PE-­‐dummy	   0.96	  (1.49)	  
6.87*	  
(2.30)	  
R-­‐Squared	   0.839	   0.526	  
Adjusted	  R-­‐Squared	   0.837	   0.520	  
F	   339.4	   72.38	  
Prob	  >	  F	   0.00	   0.00	  
The t-values are presented in parenthesis 
* Significance at the 0.05 level 
** Significance at the 0.01 level or better  
 
For starters, the R-squared is high in both regressions, somewhat higher in model 1. Also note 
that the value of the adjusted R-squared is quite similar to the value of the R-squared. The test 
also has high F-values, indicating that the test is significant.  
6.2	  Growth	  
 
As stated in the hypothesis, it was expected that growth had had a positive impact on 
profitability for all the companies. In table 7 it is seen that the estimated coefficient for the 
growth star variable is negative for private equity owned companies and negative for publicly 
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traded companies. Recall from the methodology section that the growth star variable was 
defined as one over growth, which makes the interpretation of this variable slightly different. 
As seen in table 7, the profitability decreases when the growth star variable increases. But if 
the growth star variable increases, growth decreases, since the variable growth star is defined 
as one over growth. Thus, increased growth had a positive impact on profitability for private 
equity owned companies, and Hypothesis 1 cannot be rejected for private equity owned 
companies. Conversely, growth had a negative impact on profitability for publicly traded 
companies, which rejects Hypothesis 1 for publicly traded companies. The estimated 
coefficients for growth are statistically significant in both models at the 0.05-level.  
6.3	  Debt	  level	  	  
As presented in the hypothesis section, it was expected that increased debt would result in 
higher profitability for all companies, but that the effect of increased debt level would be 
greater for private equity owned companies. As presented in table 7, the estimated coefficient 
is positive for private equity owned companies and negative for publicly traded companies. 
Thus Hypothesis 2 is rejected, since increased debt did not result in higher profitability for all 
companies. The estimated coefficients for the debt level are statistically significant at the 
0.01-level.  
6.4	  Private	  equity	  firms’	  debt	  level	  	  
As stated in the hypothesis section, an increase in the private equity firms debt level is 
expected to have had a positive impact on the private equity owned company’s profitability, 
i.e. the estimated coefficient is expected to be positive.  
 
As seen in table 7 the estimated coefficient is positive in both regressions. However it is only 
statistically significant at the 0.05-level in model 1, while not being statistically significant in 
model 2. Thus, the Hypothesis 3 cannot be rejected at a 0.05-level in model 1 but is rejected 
in model 2. 
6.5	  Working	  Capital	  	  
In the hypothesis it was stated that it was expected that the private equity owned companies 
did have lower working capital. The interpretation of that is that increased working capital 
would have had a negative effect on profitability, i.e. the estimated coefficient was expected 
to be negative.  
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As seen in table 7 the estimated coefficient is negative for both private equity owned and 
publicly traded companies in both regressions. However, since the estimated coefficient is 
statistically insignificant Hypothesis 4 is rejected.  
6.6	  Private	  Equity	  ownership	  	  
As previously stated, it was also expected that other factors, such as managerial 
improvements etc., of private equity ownership had a positive impact on profitability. 
Therefore a dummy variable was added in the regressions in order to capture such effects.  
 
In table 7 it is seen that the estimated coefficient of the dummy variable is positive and 
somewhat greater in model 2 than in model 1. However, the result is only statistically 
significant at a 0.05-level in model 2 but not statistically significant at all in model 1. Thus, 
Hypothesis 5 cannot be rejected for model 2 but is rejected for model 1.  
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7.	  Conclusions	  	  
The aim of this thesis was to compare the performance of publicly traded companies to the 
performance of private equity owned companies after the financial crisis and analyse the 
factors that had been most vital for the company’s profitability. As presented in the results, 
increased growth and higher debt had a positive effect on profitability for private equity 
owned companies, while having a negative effect on profitability for publicly traded 
companies. Our conclusion of these results is that private equity owned companies is better at 
managing the risks of higher leverage and that they successfully makes high leverage a 
strategic advantage even under extraordinary circumstances, while the publicly traded 
companies were not as successful at managing the risks of higher leverage. As presented in 
the descriptive statistics section the average return on equity and return on assets was positive 
for private equity owned companies, while being negative for publicly traded companies. It 
was expected that the average return on equity was greater for private equity owned 
companies since they traditionally have a higher debt level, but since the return on assets also 
was higher for the private equity owned companies actually performed better on average, 
which is why our conclusion is that the private equity owned companies also recovered better 
on average.  
 
As presented in the previous section the estimated coefficients for working capital was 
statistically insignificant, which is why Hypothesis 4 was rejected. Since the correlation tables 
in the descriptive statistics section shows a weak correlation between profitability and 
working capital our conclusion is that the management of the working capital was not vital for 
the profitability or recovery of either private equity owned or publicly traded companies.  
 
Private equity ownership did not have an effect on profitability that was statistically 
significant, which is why Hypothesis 5 was rejected. Our conclusion on this is that there is no 
evidence that private equity ownership affects profitability in other ways than previously 
discussed. Furthermore, the debt level of the private equity firm did not play a vital role for 
the profitability of the private equity owned companies either. Thus, Hypothesis 3 was 
rejected and it is concluded that there are no evidence that the debt level of the private equity 
firm affects the profitability of its holdings.  
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Our conclusions from this study is therefore that there are evidence that suggests that private 
equity owned companies recovered better than publicly traded companies after the financial 
crisis, and that private equity owned companies were better at managing the risks of higher 
debt levels. There is statistically significant evidence that the management of the working 
capital has an effect on profitability. Furthermore, there is no evidence to suggest that the debt 
level of the private equity firm has a significant effect on the profitability of its holdings. 	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8.	  Further	  research	  	  
The objective of this paper was to examine whether private equity owned companies 
recovered better than publicly traded companies during a four-year period after the financial 
crisis or not, and to examine what factors had affected the profitability the most. Principal-
agent problems within individual companies are discussed in this paper, but the principal-
agent problem between the private equity firm and it’s holding is not discussed. The private 
equity firm may have different intentions than the companies they own, such as boosting the 
companies’ short-term financial ratios before they sell the company, which unlikely is the 
long-term objective of the owned companies. This could potentially be harmful to the private 
equity owned company in a longer perspective, and therefore it would be interesting to see 
how the private equity owned companies perform in the long run after they have been sold. 
This could likely identify the actual, long-term impact on a company’s performance of private 
equity ownership.	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Appendix	  
Appendix	  I	  -­‐	  The	  Private	  Equity	  firms	  and	  their	  holdings	  used	  in	  the	  study.	  
Private Equity Firm Holdings 
Nordic Capital Orc Group AB 
  Munters AB 
  Menigo Foodservice 
  Euroline 
Accent Equity Scandic Hotels AB 
  Scandbook AB 
  Hoist AB 
  Mont Blanc Group AB 
  Bergteamet AB 
  
Corvara Industri & 
Skadeservice 
CapMan Cederroth International AB 
  Munksjö AB 
  DNV Inspection 
  Gunnebo Industrier AB 
  Bufab AB 
  Life Europé AB 
  Driconeq AB 
  LGT Logistics Holding AB 
  Ball Group A/S 
  Heatex AB 
  Umecrine Cognition AB 
  Åkers AB 
  Papyrus AB 
  Q-Matic AB 
  Dustin AB 
  Kwintet AB 
EQT Partners IP-Only Telecommunication 
  Granngråden AB 
  Coromatic Group AB 
  Atos Medical AB 
  Orexo AB 
  HealthCap Venture 
Innovations Kapital 21 Grams AB 
  Besedo Global Services AB 
  Crayon AB 
  Projectplace International AB 
Credelity Capital Aritco Group AB 
  Fameco Group AB 
  Saddler Scandinavia AB 
  Sevendays Finans AB 	  
